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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal justice reformers have plenty to try to fix-bail,1 sen-
tencing,2 and prison conditions,3 to name a few. 4 Among reformers'
targets are prosecutors' conduct-both prosecutors' discretionary
* Bruce A. Green is the Louis Stein Chair of Law and Director of the Stein Center at
Fordham University School of Law.
** Ellen Yaroshefsky is the Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development,
Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics, and Executive Director of the
Monroe H. Freedman Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics at Hofstra University School of
Law.
1. See, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Jail as Injunction, 107 GEO. L.J. 501, 507 (2019) (discuss-
ing the need for bail reform); Insha Rahman, Undoing the Bail Myth: Pretrial Reforms to End
Mass Incarceration, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 845, 851-52 (2019) (same).
2. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric et al., Mitigating America's Mass Incarceration Crisis With-
out Compromising Community Protection: Expanding the Role of Rehabilitation in Sentenc-
ing, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 6 (2018) (offering proposals for sentencing reform); Shon
Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, 128 YALE L.J.F. 791,
795-96 (2019) (discussing successful sentencing reform efforts).
3. See, e.g., Hopwood, supra note 2, at 795-96 (discussing successful prison reform ef-
forts); Michael Jacobson et al., Beyond the Island: Changing the Culture of New York City
Jails, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 379 (2018) (discussing the need for jail reform in New York
City).
4. See generally Barry Scheck, The Integrity of Our Convictions: Holding Stakeholders
Accountable in an Era of Criminal Justice Reform, 48 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, iv
(2019). On strategies for criminal justice reform, see Susan N. Herman, Getting There: On
Strategies for Implementing Criminal Justice Reform, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 32, 33 (2018).
For an argument that reform proposals are superficial and deceptive in that they will leave
structural deficiencies intact, see Alec Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to
Think About "Criminal Justice Reform", 128 YALE L.J.F. 848, 851 (2019).
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decision making (for example, punitive charging and plea bargain-
ing policies that contribute to over-incarceration)5 and prosecutors'
obligations in their advocacy role (for example, the scope of prose-
cutors' disclosure obligations and how they are enforced). Propo-
nents of criminal justice reform call both for more demanding laws
governing prosecutors' conduct and more effective oversight and en-
forcement of prosecutors' compliance with their legal obligations.
In the context of a national awakening to the deficiencies of the
criminal justice process, institutions with an influence over the le-
gal profession such as the American Bar Association (ABA), state
bar associations, courts, and disciplinary authorities have exam-
ined the role of professional regulation in influencing prosecutors'
conduct. In some states, following the ABA's lead, the judiciary has
expanded prosecutorial ethics rules.7 Some bar associations, and
especially the ABA, have issued advisory opinions interpreting
these rules and calling lawyers' attention to their significance.
8
And some disciplinary authorities appear to have stepped up the
rules' enforcement.9 These efforts have been buoyed by burgeoning
academic literature exploring the potential significance of the pro-
fessional regulation of prosecutors.10
5. See generally Note, The Paradox of "Progressive Prosecution", 132 HARV. L. REV. 748,
750 (2018) (describing efforts to elect "progressive prosecutors" who will exercise prosecuto-
rial discretion less harshly than conventional prosecutors).
6. See generally Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 75-78 (2016) (discussing efforts to reform prosecutors' disclosure
obligations).
7. See generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 461, 468-73 (2017) (describing the development of ABA Model Rule 3.8, governing
prosecutors' distinctive professional obligations); Laurie L. Levenson, The Politics of Ethics,
69 MERCER L. REV. 753 (2018); Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Re-
form Since Ethics 2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 (2009); Michele K. Mulhausen, Com-
ment, A Second Chance at Justice: Why States Should Adopt ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 3.8(g) and (h), 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 309 (2010).
8. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 486 (2019) (dis-
cussing prosecutors' obligations under ABA Model Rule 3.8 in dealing with unrepresented
defendants); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 454 (2009) (discuss-
ing prosecutors' disclosure obligation under ABA Model Rule 3.8(d)); N.Y. City Bar Comm.
on Profl Ethics, Formal Op. 2 (2018) (discussing prosecutors' post-conviction obligations);
N.Y.C. Bar Comm. on Profl Ethics, Formal Op. 3 (2016) (discussing prosecutors' disclosure
obligation).
9. See Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a
Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 157-63 (2016) (identifying "signs that ... disciplinary authorities
may be taking prosecutorial misconduct more seriously').
10. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor's Office, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2091 (2010); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Pros-
ecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 963 (2009); H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Pros-
ecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 56
(2013); Green, supra note 7, at 462-63; Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial
Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WISC.
250 Vol. 58
Prosecutorial Ethics Rules
And yet, when it comes to influencing prosecutors' work, prose-
cutorial ethics rules do not rank high on criminal justice reformers'
wish list. For example, the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers (NACDL), which has spent years working to expand
prosecutors' pretrial disclosure obligations, has focused on legisla-
tive reform.11 Notwithstanding legislative victories in New York,
Virginia, California, Texas, Louisiana, Ohio, and North Carolina,
12
prosecutors' disclosure obligations in federal proceedings and in
many other states remain too limited from the defense bar's per-
spective. The NACDL knows that when legislative reform efforts
falter, prosecutorial disclosure might be expanded through the in-
terpretation and enforcement of professional conduct rules that are
already in place in every jurisdiction: The NACDL has taken note
of decisions interpreting state counterparts to Rule 3.8(d) of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)13 to be
more demanding than prosecutors' constitutional obligations under
constitutional case law, 14 and has published articles encouraging
defense lawyers to try to obtain court orders based on these deci-
sions.15 But it was not until 2019 that the NACDL added Rule
L. REV. 399, 400-01 (2006); Model for Judicial Oversight and Regulation of the Brady Disclo-
sure Duty, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 87, 89 (2017); Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes
Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies That
Prove That Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 539 (2011); Bidish Sarma, Using
Deterrence Theory to Promote Prosecutorial Accountability, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 573,
579 (2017); Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for
Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1591 (2010); Bradley T. Tennis, Note, Uni-
form Ethical Regulation of Federal Prosecutors, 120 YALE L.J. 144, 148 (2010).
11. See Discovery Reform Proposals, NAT'L ASS'N CRIM. DEF. LAW. (Mar. 9, 2020),
https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspxid-31327&libID-31296.
12. See Discovery Reform Legislative Victories, NAT'L ASS'N CRIM. DEF. LAW. (Apr. 25,
2019), https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense. aspxid-31324&libID-31293.
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020) provides:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall ... make timely disclosure to the defense of all
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the
defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the pros-
ecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective or-
der of the tribunal.
14. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Bar Comm. on Profl Ethics, Formal Op. 3 (2016); In re Disciplinary
Action Against Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672, 681 (N.D. 2012). But see In re Riek, 834 N.W.2d
384, 392-93 (Wis. 2013); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125, 131 (Ohio
2010).
15. See Barry Scheck & Nancy Gertner, Combatting Brady Violations with an 'Ethical
Rule' Order for the Disclosure of Favorable Evidence, THE CHAMPION, May 2013, at 40; Irwin
H. Schwartz, Beyond Brady: Using Model Rule 3.8(d) in Federal Court for Discovery of Ex-
culpatory Information, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 2010, at 34; Legislation, Model Laws, Ethics
Rules & Commentary, NAT'L ASS'N CRIM. DEF. LAW. (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.naedl.org/
criminaldefense.aspxid-19571; see also Theresa Newman & James E. Coleman Jr., The




3.8(d) to its own reform agenda by filing an amicus brief encourag-
ing a state court to adopt a broad interpretation of that rule.16
Similarly, the national Innocence Project, while focusing signifi-
cant attention on prosecutors' obligation to correct wrongful convic-
tions, has not made a priority of Model Rules 3.8(g) and (h), which
address prosecutors' post-conviction obligations by calling on pros-
ecutors to disclose and investigate significant new exculpatory evi-
dence and to attempt to rectify wrongful convictions.17 The organi-
zation takes justifiable pride in its efforts to promote law reform
directed at procedural deficiencies that contribute to wrongful con-
victions, including erroneous eyewitness identifications, unreliable
forensic evidence, false confessions, perjurious informant testi-
mony, police and prosecutorial misconduct, and incompetent de-
fense representation.1 8 It also pursues law reform to make it easier
to detect and correct wrongful convictions, including laws to en-
hance access to post-conviction DNA testing.1 9 In publicizing its
reform efforts, the Innocence Project does not credit whatever ef-
forts it undertakes to encourage state courts to adopt ethics rules,
based on Model Rule 3.8(g) and (h).20 Moreover, the organization's
efforts to hold prosecutors accountable for misconduct only recently
expanded to include promoting more rigorous disciplinary enforce-
ment.21
16. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of the Board of Professional Responsibility, In
re: Petition to Stay the Effectiveness of Formal Ethics Op. 2017-F- 163 and Petition to Vacate




17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(g) provides:
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reason-
able likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the de-
fendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction,
(i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes
delay, and
(ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an in-
vestigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense
that the defendant did not commit.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(h) provides:
When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defend-
ant in the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did
not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.
18. See Policy Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/policy/
(last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Deborah Becker, Innocence Project Calls for Probe into 2 Former State Prosecutors in
Amherst Drug Lab Scandal, WBUR NEWS (July 21, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/news/2017/
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Criminal justice reform groups typically explore multiple ave-
nues for improving the law and legal processes. Therefore, even if
legislative reform might seem preferable from any number of per-
spectives, one might expect organizations such as the NACDL and
the Innocence Project to also explore possibilities for influencing
prosecutors' work through the disciplinary process-that is, by en-
couraging courts and disciplinary bodies to adopt, interpret, and en-
force professional conduct rules so as to demand more of prosecu-
tors. But there are a host of reasons, including the following, why
advocates of criminal justice reform might instinctively overlook or
disfavor prosecutorial ethics rules and their enforcement as a po-
tential instrument of change.
First, there is a well-founded skepticism among defense lawyers
about the utility of prosecutorial ethics rules. Many in the defense
bar perceive that disciplinary authorities have historically been dis-
inclined to initiate proceedings against prosecutors, and commen-
tators have substantiated this perception.22 While some discipli-
nary bodies may now be taking prosecutorial misconduct more se-
riously,23 the change has not been significant enough to alter de-
fense lawyers' perception.
Second, and perhaps in part because of how rarely prosecutors
are sanctioned, many in the defense bar do not even perceive pro-
fessional conduct rules to be a meaningful source of legal obligation
for prosecutors. Instead, they assume that professional conduct
rules establish "ethical" responsibilities, not legal responsibilities,
and therefore do not legally bind prosecutors. This is, however, at
least a partial misunderstanding.
It is true that the Model Rules themselves are not enforceable
law but are simply the ABA's proposal for rules to be adopted by
07/21/innocence-proj ect-foster-kaczamarek-drug-lab; Innocence Staff, Innocence Project Files
Lawsuit to Open Former ADA's Disciplinary Records, INNOCENCE PROJECT (May 22, 2019),
https://www.innocenceproj ect.org/innocence-proj ect-files-lawsuit-to-open-former-adas-disci-
plinary-records; see also Mensah M. Dean, Complaint: Prosecutor Knew Witnesses Were Lying
During Retrial of Innocent Man, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/
philly/news/crime/prosecutor-misconduct-michael-wright-dna-evidence-innocence -proj ect-
20180823.html; Nina Morrison, What Happens When Prosecutors Break the Law?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/opinion/kurtzrock-suffolk-
county-prosecutor.html; Katie Mulvaney, Journal Exclusive Free After Quarter-Century in
Prison, Raymond 'Beaver' Tempest Wants Prosecutor Disciplined, PROVIDENCE J. (July 27,
2019, 10:18 AM), https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20190727/ournal-exclusive---
free -after- quarter-centuryin-prison -raymondbeaver-tempestwants -prosecutor-disciplined.
22. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical Pros-
ecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 277 (2007); Rudin, supra note 10, at 541-42, 547-48, 560-
63, 572; Ellen YarosheIfky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline
Seriously, 8 UDC L. REV. 275, 277-78 (2004).
23. See Green & Levine, supra note 9, at 157-63 (discussing cases signaling that discipli-
nary agencies are regulating prosecutors more rigorously than in the past).
2 2020
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state courts. Likewise, "ethics opinions" published by the ABA and
state and local bar associations have no legal authority but merely
reflect the view of bar associations' ethics committees regarding the
meaning and application of professional conduct rules. But states'
professional conduct codes most assuredly are "law."24 For example,
New York prosecutors have a legal obligation to comply with appli-
cable provisions of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, just
as they must comply with constitutional law, statutes, procedural
rules, and other court rules. Adopted by courts in their rule-making
capacity, the states' professional conduct codes are part of the "law
of lawyering." They are enforceable against lawyers by the state
courts through their disciplinary processes. In interpreting and
applying their professional conduct rules, courts often give weight
to bar associations' ethics opinions.
25
Third, even if defense lawyers understand that professional con-
duct rules are "law" that may be enforced against prosecutors, at
least in disciplinary proceedings, they may not regard these rules
as law that is of utility to their clients, who have no stake in the
professional discipline of prosecutors. This is largely-but not en-
tirely-a correct understanding.
The stated purpose of professional conduct codes is not to estab-
lish parties' rights-for example, whether a client has a malpractice
claim against a lawyer or whether a lawyer's wrongdoing in litiga-
tion entitles an opposing party to a remedy-but simply to establish
standards of professional conduct to be used in lawyer discipline
proceedings.26 One might therefore assume that courts in criminal
24. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Law-
yers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 90-98 (2009) (explaining why it is a mistake to regard ethics rules
as weak or inconsequential aw").
25. For differing views on the utility of ethics opinions, see generally Jorge L. Carro, The
Ethics Opinions of the Bar: A Valuable Contribution or an Exercise in Futility?, 26 IND. L.
REV. 1 (1992); Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opin-
ions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67 (1981); Bruce A. Green, Bar Association
Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 731 (2002); David G. Trager, Do
Bar Association Ethics Committees Serve the Public or the Profession? An Argument for Pro-
cess Change, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1129 (2006).
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020) (quoting the Preface of
the MRPC):
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached.
In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary
remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules are de-
signed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.
Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by
opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a law-
254 Vol. 58
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cases will leave the enforcement of prosecutorial ethics rules to dis-
ciplinary authorities, whose lax enforcement of these rules leaves
prosecutors free to ignore them. As a general matter, there is legit-
imacy to this concern. Although courts sometimes enforce or give
weight to the professional conduct rules in the course of adjudica-
tion, including criminal adjudication,27 they rarely do so. 28 In pre-
trial or trial practice, courts generally look to case law rather than
ethics rules to determine prosecutorial disclosure obligations and
rarely do courts refer prosecutors who have violated ethics rules to
disciplinary authorities.29 Particularly in post-conviction proceed-
ings, courts are unlikely to provide remedies for prosecutorial mis-
conduct that violates disciplinary rules but that does not violate
constitutional or statutory provisions.30 Indeed, even constitutional
and statutory violations are not necessarily remediable, but may be
subject to harmless error analysis and other doctrines that limit the
availability of remedies in order to promote finality and judicial
economy.31 The utility of professional conduct rules, from any indi-
vidual criminal defendant's perspective, may depend on persuading
trial judges in criminal cases to enforce them, and that may be a
heavy lift.
Further, if disciplinary authorities and courts were to enforce
prosecutorial ethics rules more rigorously in the disciplinary pro-
cess, where they are meant to be enforced, criminal defendants
might be harmed more than helped. Punishing a prosecutor pro-
vides no direct benefit to a defendant harmed by the prosecutor's
yer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disci-
plinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or trans-
action has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.
27. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457, 468 (Minn. 1999) (suppressing evidence as
remedy for prosecutor's violation of MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (MINN. BAR ASS'N
1993)).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 842 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that
suppression was not a permissible remedy for prosecutor's violation of the rule forbidding
communications with represented parties); United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. 1430,
1433 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Although suppression necessarily results from a constitutional viola-
tion, the same result is not a foregone conclusion in the case of an ethical violation by a
prosecutor.").
29. See, e.g., New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the
Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1972-77, 2005-06, 2011-13,
2018-22, 2033 (2010) [hereinafter New Perspectives on Brady: Report of Working Groups].
30. See, e.g., House v. State, 947 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
31. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters: Reassociating Bag-
ley Materiality, Strickland Prejudice, and Cumulative Harmless Error, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1153, 1155 (2004) (discussing ineffective assistance of counsel claims and
Brady violations that do not lead to reversal because of the harmless error doctrine); Brandon
L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WISC. L.
REV. 35, 56 (2005) (discussing violations of substantive constitutional rights resulting in
wrongful convictions are often not remediable due to the harmless error doctrine).
2 2020
Duquesne Law Review
misconduct and it may not provide an indirect benefit either, be-
cause disciplinary cases against prosecutors are often brought years
after the prosecutorial conduct in question, and then only after the
impropriety of the prosecutor's conduct has already been adjudi-
cated in court proceedings. An increased risk of discipline for pro-
fessional misconduct may encourage future prosecutors to comply
more carefully with their legal and ethical obligations, if the possi-
bility of discipline comes to seem less remote. But then, there may
be unintended harms that make other enforcement mechanisms
preferable to disciplinary enforcement. Relations between opposing
lawyers in criminal cases can be fraught,32 and discipline ups the
ante.33 It is hard to think of anything more provocative than an
accusation of professional misconduct, and the bad feeling it pro-
duces may disadvantage not only the current client but future cli-
ents with cases against the accused prosecutor or others in the pros-
ecutor's office. 34 Further, an accusation of professional misconduct
may encourage retaliation, putting the defense lawyer on the defen-
sive.
Fourth, even if professional conduct rules were enforced, their
reach might be too limited to make much of a difference. By their
very nature, the normative standards set by professional conduct
rules are meant to be a "floor." 35 That is, the rules define the least
that lawyers can get away with to avoid being subject to a discipli-
nary sanction-for example, the least that a lawyer must do to be
32. See Bruce A. Green, The Right to Two Criminal Defense Lawyers, 69 MERCER L. REV.
675, 687 (2018) ("In some jurisdictions, individual or institutional relationships between de-
fense lawyers and prosecutors are mistrustful or even hostile.").
33. Levenson, supra note 7, at 768 ("[D]efense lawyers must resist he temptation to turn
every prosecutorial mistake into an ethical violation. While defense lawyers have a duty to
act zealously on behalf of their clients, prosecutors who feel attacked are less likely to act in
a collaborative manner, especially when such collaboration might benefit a defendant.").
34. The New York Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers established the Prosecuto-
rial and Judicial Complaint Center (PJCC) as an investigative and reporting center for such
misconduct. The PJCC's was created because criminal defense lawyers historically were
loath to file complaints against prosecutors, fearing potential repercussions against future
clients and themselves. The PJCC, despite public pronouncements of its work and repeated
informal complaints made by defense lawyers andjudges, has received few formal complaints
from defense lawyers about prosecutorial misconduct. The perception is that disciplinary
authorities will not act to sanction prosecutors. Prosecutorial and Judicial Complaint Com-
mittee, N.Y. ST. ASS'N CRIM. DEF. LAW., https://nysacdl.site-ym.com/page/PJCC (last visited
Feb. 17, 2020).
35. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Bar Comm. on Profl Ethics, Formal Op. 2 (2018) ("[T]he Rules gov-
erning conduct of prosecutors were adopted solely for purposes of professional discipline.
Like other rules, they 'state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall
without being subject o disciplinary action.' These Rules are not meant to state the limit of
what prosecutors and their offices can or should do to rectify wrongful convictions." (quoting
N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 6 (N.Y. BAR ASS'N 2018))).
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regarded as competent,3 to avoid assisting a client's criminal act,37
or to avoid using perjury at trial.38 Reformers do not want to estab-
lish minimal requirements for prosecutors but to establish rigorous
requirements for prosecutors to prevent and correct wrongful con-
victions. A legislative reform effort invariably holds out promise to
achieve more demanding normative requirements. Moreover, once
norms governing prosecutors' conduct are codified in criminal pro-
cedure rules or statutes, they are often enforceable through the dis-
ciplinary process: a prosecutor's deliberate violation of a procedural
obligation is likely to be subject to sanction under the professional
conduct rules;39 indeed, even a prosecutor's negligent failure to ful-
fill a procedural obligation may be sanctionable, at least in theory.40
Consequently, if one were confident of success, a defense effort
aimed at reforming prosecutorial conduct would always favor legis-
lative over disciplinary reform. Disciplinary reform may seem to be
worth pursuing only if legislative reform is likely to be unavailing.
Further, professional conduct rules typically address lawyers'
professional conduct at a level of generality and focus on areas of
conduct that might be thought to implicate lawyers' ethics; they do
not address social or criminal-justice policy per se. This, too, inher-
ently limits their reach and scope. The more detailed, technical,
and restrictive the rules become-that is, the more they look like
legislation-the less legitimacy they have as professional conduct
or "ethics" rules, and the more difficult it becomes to persuade
courts to adopt them and uphold them in the face of legal chal-
lenges.41 On the other hand, rules that are sufficiently vague to
36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
37. See id. r. 1.2(d).
38. See id. r. 3.3.
39. See, e.g., id. r. 3.4(a).
40. See id. r. 1.1; see also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrong-
ful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1,
13-28 (2009) (discussing the potential role of the competence rule in regulating prosecutors).
41. Model Rule 3.8(e), which some state courts have declined to adopt, is a case in point.
Its premise is straightforward-namely, that prosecutors should not chill defense lawyers'
relationship with counsel and defendants' willingness to confide in their lawyers by need-
lessly subpoenaing defense lawyers to testify about their clients. The underlying idea that
lawyers should not intrude on the opposing party's confidential relationship with counsel
finds expression in various rules, including Rule 4.2, which restricts communications with
represented persons, and Rule 4.4(b), which requires the disclosure of another party's inad-
vertently disclosed information. But Rule 3.8(e) is drafted at a level of detail that makes it
seem, at least to some, more legislative than ethical. See, e.g., Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court, 214
F.3d 4, 20 (1st Cir. 2000) ("Local Rule 3.8(f) [the counterpart to current ABA Model Rule
3.8(e)], though doubtless motivated by ethical concerns, has outgrown those humble begin-
nings .... As written, Local Rule 3.8(f) is more than an ethical standard. It adds a novel
procedural step-the opportunity for a pre-service adversarial hearing-and to compound
the matter, ordains that the hearing be conducted with new substantive standards in mind.").
2 2020
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gain judicial acceptance as ethics rules are likely to leave room for
prosecutors to interpret and apply them liberally in ways that
weaken their significance.
Fifth, from a historical perspective, efforts to employ the profes-
sional conduct rules as a means of reining in prosecutorial excess
have not been hugely successful. For example, ABA Model Rule
3.8(e), designed to curb prosecutors' practice of subpoenaing law-
yers for evidence about their clients, has not been rigorously en-
forced in states that have adopted it.42 Likewise, efforts to persuade
courts to interpret and apply the no-contact rule to restrict police
investigations made only a marginal impact.
43
For these reasons and perhaps others, criminal justice reformers
might intuitively favor legislative reform-and, perhaps, even the
reform of judicial decisional law-over the amendment and enforce-
ment of professional conduct rules. And they would be right, in
general, to see legislative reform as more promising and significant.
By way of example, many years of reform efforts in New York re-
cently culminated in the adoption of a new criminal procedure law
which, among other things, expanded defendants' discovery rights
in criminal cases.44 The law details what prosecutors must provide
to the defense and establishes timing requirements as well as pro-
cedural consequences for prosecutors' failure to comply.45 By their
nature, professional conduct rules could never be as demanding or
effective.
Does this mean, however, that reformers should not expend any
energy encouraging state courts to adopt and enforce prosecutorial
ethics rules? This article examines that question, focusing on the
rules noted above-those governing prosecutors' pretrial disclosure
obligations and their post-conviction obligations. It examines the
case for expanding reform efforts to take advantage of the profes-
sional conduct rules. As Part II discusses, prosecutors throughout
the country are already subject to a version of Model Rule 3.8(d),
42. See supra note 41; see also Green, supra note 7, at 471 ("Although many states have
Rule 3.8(e) on the books, it is questionable whether the provision has an impact in the federal
grand jury investigations at which it was principally directed."). For a recent and rare ex-
ception, see Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Fina, No. 2624, 2020 Pa. LEXIS 1056 (Pa. Feb.
19, 2020).
43. See Green, supra note 7, at 475-76.
44. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245 (eff 1/01/2020); see Barry Kamins, Bail, Discovery and
Speedy Trial: The New Legislation, N.Y.L.J. (May 31, 2019, 12:30 PM),
http s: //www. law. com/newyorklawj ournal/2 019/05/3 1/b ail- discovery- and- sp eedy-trial-the -
new-legislation/ (analyzing new discovery statute, which replaced "one of the most regressive
in the nation").
45. See Kamins, supra note 44.
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which requires prosecutors to disclose evidence that "tends to ne-
gate the guilt of the accused;" reformers might attempt to persuade
courts to interpret the rule to demand broader and/or earlier disclo-
sure than does the Brady case law. Additionally, as Part III dis-
cusses, prosecutors in only 19 states are subject to a version of Rules
3.8(g) and/or 3.8(h); reformers might try to persuade other state ju-
diciaries to adopt one or both provisions. In both cases, one might
wonder whether the effort is worthwhile given the prospects for suc-
cess and the potential payout. While the likelihood of success pre-
sumably varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, success in some ju-
risdictions is demonstrably achievable, and, we argue, successful
efforts will be meaningfully rewarded.
II. PROSECUTORS' PRETRIAL DUTY OF DISCLOSURE
Among the most contentious issues in criminal practice is the ex-
tent of prosecutors' disclosure obligations. Although the term
"Brady obligations" is sometimes used as a shorthand, prosecutors'
obligations to disclose evidence and information to the defense de-
rive from various sources including federal and state constitutional
provisions (as interpreted by courts), federal and state statutes,
court rules and orders, and professional conduct rules. Prosecuto-
rial disclosure serves an essential role, enabling defense lawyers to
counsel their clients about the decisions they must make, to negoti-
ate effectively, to defend their clients competently in court, and to
make effective sentencing arguments. Prosecutors' obligations vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and are often uncertain in scope,
but, in general, defense lawyers perceive both that prosecutors' dis-
closure obligations are too narrow and that prosecutors often fail to
fully comply with them. Consequently, prosecutorial disclosure is
a significant target of criminal justice reform efforts.
The starting point for discussions of prosecutors' pretrial disclo-
sure, and a focus of the defense bar's dissatisfaction, is the consti-
tutional obligation established in Brady v. Maryland4 and subse-
quent decisions. The judicial decisions generally address the ques-
tion of whether a conviction must be overturned because of the pros-
ecution's failure to disclose favorable evidence to the accused for use
in defending the case at trial. Brady, the leading United States
Supreme Court decision, held that the "suppression by the prosecu-
tion of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
46. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-
ment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion."47 A later decision, United States v. Bagley,48 defined "material
to guilt or punishment" as a "reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."49  The materiality standard is the
source of significant and ongoing controversy because, in most ju-
risdictions, this standard for reversal on appeal is also utilized as
the standard for defining prosecutors' initial constitutional duty to
provide pretrial disclosure of information.50 In these jurisdictions,
the prosecution does not have to produce favorable evidence to the
defense if the evidence is deemed unlikely to contribute to an ac-
quittal.51 One might argue that prosecutors are constitutionally ob-
ligated to disclose all favorable evidence before trial because the
materiality standard, like a harmless error standard, applies only
post-trial and is designed to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of
resources when it is a foregone conclusion that a retrial will result
in another conviction. But only a few courts agree.52 The Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) endorses the pretrial "materiality" standard
while urging prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure.53 The ABA,
47. Id. at 87.
48. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
49. Id. at 682.
50. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321,
1334-35 (2011).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2001); see also United
States v. Causey, 356 F. Supp. 2d 681, 696 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (adopting materiality as the
standard).
52. See United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005) ("[T]he government
must always produce any potentially exculpatory or otherwise favorable evidence without
regard to how the withholding of such evidence might be viewed-with the benefit of hind-
sight-as affecting the outcome of the trial."); United States v. Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1228,
1233 (D. Nev. 2004) ("Simply because 'material' failures to disclose exculpatory evidence vi-
olate due process does not mean only 'material' disclosures are required."); United States v.
Carter, 313 F. Supp. 2d 921, 925 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (same); United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("Because the definitions of materiality as applied to
appellate review are not appropriate in the pretrial discovery context, the Court relies on the
plain meaning of 'evidence favorable to an accused' as discussed in Brady.").
53. U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-5.001(B)(1) (2010) ("Exculpatory and im-
peachment evidence is material to a finding of guilt-and thus the Constitution requires dis-
closure-when there is a reasonable probability that effective use of the evidence will result
in an acquittal. Recognizing that it is sometimes difficult to assess the materiality of evi-
dence before trial, prosecutors generally must take a broad view of materiality and err on the
side of disclosing exculpatory and impeaching evidence. While ordinarily, evidence that
would not be admissible at trial need not be disclosed, this policy encourages prosecutors to
err on the side of disclosure if admissibility is a close question." (citations omitted)).
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in contrast, takes the view that prosecutors should disclose favora-
ble evidence regardless of whether it appears to be material.54 The
practice among state prosecutors varies.55 Defense lawyers lack
confidence that prosecutors correctly assess whether favorable evi-
dence is material and believe that prosecutors, based on erroneous
assessments, often withhold favorable evidence that is in fact ma-
terial.
5
Another source of defense lawyers' dissatisfaction is prosecutors'
delay in disclosing evidence and information. Although most fed-
eral and state discovery laws and rules require prosecutors to make
"timely disclosure," some courts regard disclosure to be sufficiently
timely if it is made on the eve of trial, in time for the defense to offer
it into evidence.57 Some courts permit even longer delay if favorable
evidence is useful only to impeach prosecution witnesses.58 Another
sore point is whether favorable evidence must be disclosed at all if
a case ends in a guilty plea, not a trial. Defense lawyers perceive
that favorable evidence is needed not only to prepare for trial but to
advise the accused whether to plead guilty, but many courts disa-
gree.59
Reformers' efforts over the past two decades to expand prosecu-
tors' disclosure obligations have taken place against the back-
ground of cases in which prosecutors failed even to meet Brady's
minimal constitutional requirement. Perhaps most significant was
the 2009 trial of Senator Ted Stevens in which federal prosecutors
withheld exculpatory material, which, when discovered after the
trial, resulted in the government's agreement o set aside the jury's
54. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3.5-4
(AM. BAR ASS'N 2017) ("Before trial of a criminal case .... regardless of whether the prosecu-
tor believes it is likely to change the result of the proceeding .... [a prosecutor should disclose]
all information in the possession of the prosecution or its agents that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense charged, impeach the government's witnesses or
evidence, or reduce the likely punishment of the accused if convicted.").
55. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 34-35.
56. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cogni-
tive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590-91 (2006) (discussing irrationality in human
decision making as it affects prosecutors); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 291 (2006) (discussing
tunnel vision that leads to failure to disclose information and other issues); Bennett L. Gersh-
man, Litigating Brady v. Maryland, Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. L. REV. 531, 538
(2007) (discussing various ways in which prosecutors fail to comply with disclosure obliga-
tions).
57. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 50, at 1337.
58. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1, 3 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Nei-
ther Brady nor any other case we know of requires that disclosure under Brady must be made
before trial.").
59. See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutorial Disclosure of Exculpatory In-
formation in the Guilty Plea Context: Current Law, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2007, at 50, 50.
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guilty verdict and end the prosecution.0 The trial judge, District
Judge Emmett Sullivan, later observed that he had "never seen
mishandling and misconduct like what I have seen" committed by
DOJ's trial prosecutorsj1 and he initiated the practice of issuing a
"standing Brady order" in every criminal case so that future prose-
cutors who deliberately violated their Brady obligations could be
held in contempt of court. 2 Elsewhere around the country, a fed-
eral judge in Boston excoriated federal prosecutors for discovery
failures and issued an order to show cause why they should not be
sanctioned,3 and federal judges in Florida and Montana chastised
other federal prosecutors who withheld key evidence.4 Cases such
as these spurred proposed federal legislation to expand federal
prosecutors' disclosure obligationsj 5 but the proposal stalled in the
face of DOJ opposition.
Some state legislatures were more responsive to high profile
cases of prosecutors' discovery misconduct. Most significantly, the
wrongful prosecution of members of the Duke University lacrosse
team on sexual assault charges in 2006 ultimately led to the disbar-
ment of District Attorney Michael Nifong for withholding exculpa-
tory evidence, among other wrongdoing,6 and then to North Caro-
lina legislation liberalizing the state's disclosure rules.6 7 In Texas,
60. See Jason Kreag, Disclosing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 72 VAND. L. REV. 297, 315-17
(2019) (discussing prosecutorial misconduct in the Ted Stevens prosecution and its signifi-
cance to discovery reform efforts); see also Bennett L. Gershman, Subverting Brady v. Mary-
land and Denying a Fair Trial: Studying the Schuelke Report, 64 MERCER L. REV. 683, 683-
86 (2013) (describing a report of prosecutorial misconduct in the Ted Stevens case).
61. Neil A. Lewis, Tables Turned on Prosecution in Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/politics/08stevens.html.
62. Emmett G. Sullivan, Enforcing Compliance with Constitutionally Required Disclo-
sures: A Proposed Rule, CARDOZO L. REV. DE Novo 138, attachment 3 (2016) (Order).
63. See United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 185 (D. Mass. 2009); see also United
States v. Jones, 686 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (D. Mass. 2010).
64. United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1322, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2009); United
States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (D. Mont. 2006).
65. See Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64
MERCER L. REV. 639, 641 (2013) (discussing the proposed Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence
Act of 2012).
66. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbar-
ment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 257, 306 (2008); Duff Wilson, Prosecutor in Duke Case Is Disbarred for Ethics Breaches,
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/16/us/16cnd-nifong.html.
67. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A (2019).
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similar reforms followed the highly publicized exoneration of Mi-
chael Morton,8 who was convicted of murdering his wife and im-
prisoned for a quarter century before his conviction was overturned
based on the prosecution's suppression of exculpatory evidence.9
Where courts cannot be persuaded to interpret the constitution
more demandingly and legislatures cannot be persuaded to adopt
more demanding statutory requirements, reformers might turn
their attention to professional conduct rules as a basis for broader
prosecutorial disclosure obligations. Model Rule 3.8(d) calls for
prosecutors to disclose evidence and information "that tends to ne-
gate the guilt of the accused,"70 as did an earlier provision of the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,71 and every state ethics
code now includes a corresponding provision.72 For decades, com-
mentators have pointed out that the professional conduct rule is
more demanding than the constitutional case law,73 and the United
States Supreme Court itself acknowledged as much, observing that
"the obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense may
arise more broadly under a prosecutor's ethical.., obligations" than
under Brady74 and that Brady" requires less of the prosecution
than" does Model Rule 3.8(d).75
The ABA drew attention to the potential significance of the rule
in 2009, when its Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility issued Opinion 09-454,71 which discussed how Model
Rule 3.8(d) differs from, and is in some respects more demanding
68. Michael Morton Act, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 106 (codified as amendment to TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2019)).
69. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Inquiry Sought for Texas Prosecutor over Wrongful Convic-
tion, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/20/nation/la-
na-texas-prosecutor-20111220.
70. Model Rules of Professional Conduct r. 3.8(d) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2020), requires a pros-
ecutor to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in con-
nection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigat-
ing information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this re-
sponsibility by a protective order of the tribunal."
71. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
72. The last state to adopt a version of Rule 3.8(d) was California, which adopted the
provision in 2018 over significant opposition by the California District Attorneys' Association,
see Letter from Patrick McGrath, President, Cal. Dist. Attorneys' Ass'n, to Chairpersons of
the Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Oct. 1, 2015) (on file
with the author). See Don J. DeBenedictis, State Could Soon Impose Ethics Rules on Prose-
cutors, the Daily Journal, April 30, 2015 (quoting Chief Justice: "It is time to have a uniform
standard with uniform pressure on prosecutors to disclose information in a timely fashion.")
73. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 454 (2009).
74. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009).
75. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437(1995).
76. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 454.
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than, the Brady line of decisions.7 7 Most importantly, the opinion
concluded that Rule 3.8(d) "does not implicitly include the materi-
ality limitation recognized in the constitutional case law," stem-
ming from Brady v. Maryland, but instead "requires prosecutors to
disclose favorable evidence so that the defense can decide on its util-
ity. " 78 Additionally, the opinion explained that the rule's require-
ment of "timely disclosure" required prosecutors to disclose favora-
ble evidence "as soon as reasonably practical."79 This means that
disclosure must be made in time for the defense to take account of
favorable evidence in conducting pretrial investigation, developing
strategy, and advising the accused whether to plead guilty. In these
respects, prosecutors' disclosure obligation under the rule is more
demanding than under the constitutional case law in most jurisdic-
tions. On the other hand, the opinion recognized an important re-
spect in which the rule is less demanding-namely, it requires dis-
closure only of evidence and information "known" to the prosecutor
and does not obligate the prosecutor to seek out favorable infor-
mation in the hands of investigators or other government agents.80
The ABA's interpretation of its model rule, although potentially
influential, is not authoritative. Although states' rules of profes-
sional conduct corresponding to Model Rule 3.8(d) are identically or
similarly worded, state courts are free to interpret their rules dif-
ferently. Prosecutors can be expected to urge their state courts to
do so. For example, the DOJ has consistently argued that inter-
preting Rule 3.8(d) more broadly than other law will create a "con-
fusing double standard" and would let defendants "engage in blind
fishing expeditions through the government's files." 81 Unless their
state judiciary has issued a decision or other authoritative writing
adopting the ABA's interpretation, many or most prosecutors freely
ignore the ABA opinion.
The question of whether a state's version of Rule 3.8(d) imposes
requirements independent of those set forth in state and federal
statutes and case law may arise in any of a number of ways. A state
77. The ABA opinion rejected the argument, which some courts have adopted, that the
professional obligation under Rule 3.8(d) is coextensive with prosecutors' disclosure obliga-
tions under Brady. Id. at 3. After reviewing the history and wording of the Model Rule, the
opinion concluded that the drafters of Model Rule 3.8(d) "made no attempt to codify the evolv-
ing constitutional case law." Id.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id. at 6.
80. Id. at 5-6.
81. Eli Hager & The Marshall Project, DOJ is Challenging Tennessee Ethics Opinion on
Prosecutors Obligation to Disclose Evidence, ABA J. (Aug. 16, 2018, 2:00 PM), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/doj is challenging-tennessee-ethics-opinion-on-prose-
cutors obligations to d.
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or local bar association might issue an advisory opinion interpreting
its state's rule broadly; in some states, these opinions would be re-
viewable by the state's high court.82 Alternatively, a state discipli-
nary authority relying on a broad interpretation of the state's rule
might proceed against a prosecutor who withheld favorable evi-
dence from the accused.83 Or a defense lawyer in a criminal trial
might ask the trial judge to order the prosecutor to make disclosure
in compliance not only with relevant case law, statutes, and proce-
dural rules but also with the state's version of Rule 3.8(d), as
broadly construed.
84
So far, authorities in only around a quarter of United States ju-
risdictions have considered whether its jurisdiction's counterpart o
Model Rule 3.8(d) is more demanding than the constitutional case
law or is merely coextensive with prosecutors' other legal duties.
Those authorities have reached different conclusions. State courts
and ethics committees in New York, California, Texas, North Da-
kota, Utah, and Washington, D.C. have agreed with the ABA's
Opinion 09-454 that prosecutors' ethical duty under the rule is in-
dependent of, and in some ways more extensive than, prosecutors'
other legal obligations.85 For example, rejecting the DOd's position,
a court in Washington, D.C. disciplined a federal prosecutor under
that jurisdiction's Rule 3.8(d), concluding that the rule did not in-
clude a materiality limitation.86 Likewise, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts added a comment to its amended version of Rule 3.8
to clarify that "[t]he obligations imposed on a prosecutor by the
82. See, e.g., In re: Petition to Stay the Effectiveness of Ethics Op. 2017-F-163, 582
S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2019) (vacating ethics opinion issued by the state's Board of Profes-
sional Responsibility and holding that, in general, "the ethical obligations under Rule 3.8(d)
of Tennessee's Rules of Professional Conduct are coextensive in scope with the obligations of
a prosecutor as provided by applicable statute, rules of criminal procedure, our state and
federal constitutions, and case law').
83. See, e.g., In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 213 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
84. See supra note 15 (citing articles discussing this strategy).
85. See N.Y.C. Bar Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 3 (2016); In re Larsen, 379 P.3d
1209, 1216 (Utah 2016); Kline, 113 A.3d at 213 (concluding that the Washington, D.C. version
of the rule does not include a "materiality' limitation); Schultz v. Comm'n for the Lawyer
Discipline of the State Bar of Tex., No. 55649, 2015 WL 9855916, at *1 (Tex. Bd. Disciplinary
App. Dec. 17, 2015) (concluding that Texas Rule 3.09(d) is "broader than Brady"); In re Dis-
ciplinary Action Against Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672 (N.D. 2012) (rejecting the argument that
the North Dakota equivalent o New York Rule 3.8(b) is coextensive with Brady); People v.
Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206-07 (Cal. 1990) (finding ethical violation based on, in part, the
prosecutor's failure to timely comply with discovery obligations regardless of whether the
belated failure violated the constitutional duty to disclose evidence under Brady).
86. Kline, 113 A.3d at 213. For other notable examples of discipline for failure to comply
with prosecutorial disclosure obligations, see Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 6, at 82.
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rules of professional conduct are not coextensive with the obliga-
tions imposed by substantive law."87
However, other courts, including in Colorado, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Wisconsin, Louisiana, and most recently, Tennessee, have held
that, despite its wording, the rule implicitly codifies other law and
demands nothing more.88 In general, these courts reason that pros-
ecutors would find it too difficult to have to comply with yet one
more source of discovery law. For example, the Louisiana Supreme
Court expressed concern about the imposition of inconsistent dis-
closure requirements upon prosecutors.89 The Tennessee Supreme
Court, in turn, cited this opinion and explained, "[t]o say that our
ethical rules require prosecutors to consider different standards
than their constitutional and legal requirements has the potential
to bring about a myriad of conflicts."90
The question for reform groups such as the NACDL is whether to
expend energy promoting the ABA's interpretation in the many
states where there is no authoritative decision regarding the scope
and application of Rule 3.8(d). Individual defense lawyers might
also present the interpretive question, but they would obviously
benefit from organizational support. Reform groups might ask the
state bar's ethics committee or the state bar itself to interpret Rule
3.8(d) to require prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence known
to them regardless of whether it is material in the constitutional
sense, and to do so as soon as reasonably practical. But, in the end,
only the judiciary can authoritatively interpret the rule.91 While a
87. MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 3A.
88. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Assn v. Ward, 353 P.3d 509, 521 (Okla. 2015) (declining
to adopt the ABA Committee's interpretation of Model Rule 3.8(d) and construing the Okla-
homa version of rule as "consistent with the scope of disclosure required by applicable law");
In re Riek, 834 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Wis. 2013) (declining to construe Wisconsin version of rule
"to impose ethical obligations on prosecutors that transcend the requirements
of Brady"); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ohio 2010) (declin-
ing to adopt an ethical duty that would "threaten prosecutors with professional discipline for
failing to disclose evidence even when the applicable law does not require disclosure"); see
also In re Petition to Stay the Effectiveness of Ethics Op. 2017-F- 163, 582 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn.
2019). See generally David L. Hudson Jr., Split Intensifies over Prosecutors' Ethical Disclo-
sure Duties, ABA J. (Oct. 2, 2019, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/web/article/split-
over-prosecutors-ethical-disclosure-duties-intensfies.
89. In re Seastrunk, 236 So. 3d 509, 519 (La. 2017); see also Ethics Op. 201 7-F-163, 582
S.W.3d at 200.
90. Ethics Op. 2017-F-163, 582 S.W.3d at 209.
91. For example, in the process leading up to California's adoption of a provision based
on Rule 3.8(d), proponents urged an interpretation consistent with Opinion 454. See, e.g.,
Letter from Laurie Levinson, Professor of Law, Loyola Law Sch., and Barry C. Scheck, Pro-
fessor of Law, Cardozo Sch. of Law, to the Cal. Comm'n for Revision of the Rules of Profl
Conduct (April 10, 2015) (on file with author) ("Rule 3.8(d) is designed to be broader and
independent of Brady, requiring 'timely' and prophylactic disclosure of all information that
could be Brady or impeachment evidence [anything that 'tends to negate guilt or mitigate
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state trial judge might be asked in a criminal prosecution to order
the prosecutor to comply with Rule 3.8(d), as interpreted by the
ABA, the judge may be reluctant to do so. Likewise, while discipli-
nary authorities might be asked to proceed against a prosecutor
who withheld evidence that was favorable but not material in order
to achieve an authoritative interpretation, disciplinary authorities
may be similarly reluctant. These are not the only options, how-
ever. In states where the court adopts interpretive Comments to
the professional conduct rules, a reform group might petition the
judiciary to add a Comment codifying the ABA's interpretation of
Rule 3.8(d). Alternatively, an organization might urge the judiciary
to codify this interpretation in a court rule or order. For example,
in response to lobbying by the Innocence Project and other organi-
zations, the New York judiciary has adopted a standing order re-
garding prosecutors' disclosure obligations that is more demanding
than existing case law and that tracks the language of Rule 3.8(d).
92
A willful violation of the order may be sanctioned as a contempt of
court.
93
punishment'] in order to make sure Brady violations do not occur .... Additionally, the rule
promotes judicial efficiency by eliminating subjective 'materiality' evaluations prior to
trial.").
92. The court directive and order (1) spells out three broad categories of information that
should be disclosed to the defense-exculpatory, impeaching, and those relevant to suppres-
sion-precisely tailored to existing state and federal case law requiring disclosure as well as
New York ethical rules; (2) makes specific reference to types of evidence that are required to
be disclosed, including any benefits or promises made to witnesses for their cooperation, prior
inconsistent statements and uncharged criminal conduct or convictions, and information re-
garding a witness's mental or physical illness or substance abuse; (3) encourages early dis-
closure by reminding prosecutors to produce information as soon as "reasonably possible,"
and presumptively no later than 30 days before the start of a felony trial and 15 days before
the start of a misdemeanor trial; and (4) allows for personal sanctions against prosecutors
who engage in "willful and deliberate" violations of the order. Press Release, N.Y. State
Unified Court Sys., Chief Judge DiFiore Announces Implementation of New Measure Aimed
at Enhancing the Delivery of Justice in Criminal Cases (Nov. 8, 2017), http://
ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/files/2018-05/PR17-17.pdff The order was
adopted by more than 80% of New York's lower state courts. The statewide debate about the
Order contributed to the significant law reform efforts that resulted in legislation that im-
poses sweeping changes to disclosure practices in New York as of January 2020. The new
law requires prosecutors to produce categories of information and evidence that are encom-
passed by Rule 3.8 (d). See also infra text accompanying note 93.
93. See Scheck & Gertner, supra note 15, at 41; see also Nancy Gertner & Barry Scheck,
How to Rein in Rogue Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304692804577281852966541834 (last updated Mar. 15, 2012, 7:31 PM)
('A direct order by a judge to follow the ethics rule and disclose all evidence that 'tends to
negate guilt' will act as a deterrent to the overzealous prosecutor. Disobedience of a direct
court order is contempt, which is an ongoing offense. So contempt prosecutions ofunscrupu-
Ious prosecutors whose suppression of exculpatory evidence is discovered many years after
the act won't be derailed by statute-of-limitations problems (which have been a significant
obstacle to prosecuting prosecutors).").
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It seems obvious that criminal defendants will benefit if the court
determines that the prosecutorial obligation under Rule 3.8(d) is
more demanding than the constitutional and statutory disclosure
obligations. The benefit is that defendants will receive more, and
prompter, disclosure. Prosecutors who do not currently comply
with the admonition to resolve doubts about materiality in favor of
disclosure might be expected to comply with a judicial decision that
says that all favorable evidence must be disclosed under Rule 3.8(d),
even if it is not material, and that this information must be dis-
closed as soon as reasonably practicable. This is true even though
a violation of the rule in itself will probably not be remedied by the
reversal of a criminal conviction. Most prosecutors presumably
want to comply with professional obligations for their own sake,
94
and some of those remaining will be motivated by the risk of a dis-
ciplinary prosecution. Wholly apart from prosecutors' personal re-
sponsibility to keep current regarding their disclosure obligations,
95
prosecutors' offices can be expected to train prosecutors regarding
obligations imposed by Rule 3.8(d), as interpreted by the court. Fur-
ther, prosecutors can be reminded of the professional obligation in
defense lawyers' pretrial requests for disclosure and discovery mo-
tions, and trial courts can be expected to issue reminders and orders
referring to the distinct obligation under Rule 3.8(d) once it is es-
tablished in the jurisdiction.
Even if reformers ultimately favor expanding prosecutors' disclo-
sure obligations through legislation and constitutional decision
making, their reform efforts can be enhanced by persuading state
courts to adopt the ABA's interpretation of Rule 3.8(d), which ac-
cords with the plain language of the rule. The position adopted by
the ABA-that prosecutors should disclose favorable evidence even
if it is not material, and that this evidence should be disclosed
promptly and before a guilty plea-is consistent with the positions
taken by organizations pursuing discovery reform in criminal
94. For a more skeptical view, see United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir.
2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting):
Due to the nature of a Brady violation, it's highly unlikely wrongdoing will ever come
to light in the first place. This creates a serious moral hazard for those prosecutors
who are more interested in winning a conviction than serving justice. In the rare event
that the suppressed evidence does surface, the consequences usually leave the prose-
cution no worse than had it complied with Brady from the outset .... If the violation
is found to be material (a standard that will almost never be met under the panel's
construction), the prosecution gets a do-over, making it no worse off than if it had dis-
closed the evidence in the first place.
95. See Connickv. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 65-67 (2011).
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cases.9 When constitutional arguments are advanced and legisla-
tion is proposed that would embody the ABA's position, prosecutors
push back, contending that broader disclosure will undermine the
public interest by leading to obstruction of justice, excessive admin-
istrative burdens, or other harms. But prosecutors' argument be-
comes less credible every time a state court adopts the ABA's inter-
pretation of Rule 3.8(d) and that state's prosecutors then start mak-
ing broader disclosure without suffering demonstrably harmful con-
sequences. Therefore, even if a state court opinion interpreting
Rule 3.8(d) broadly is unlikely to be any reform group's ultimate
objective, such an opinion may be an intermediate step toward a
more impactful constitutional decision or statute.
97
III. PROSECUTORS' POST-CONVICTION OBLIGATIONS
In 2008, in the wake of the innocence movement, the ABA
amended the Model Rules to address prosecutors' post-conviction
obligations.98 Rule 3.8(g) established new obligations for a prosecu-
tor who "knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a
reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an
offense of which the defendant was convicted."99 At minimum, the
prosecutor must "promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate
court or authority."100 Additionally, "if the conviction was obtained
in the prosecutor's jurisdiction," the prosecutor has two further ob-
ligations01-the prosecutor must "promptly disclose that evidence
to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay"102 and must "un-
dertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause
an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted
of an offense that the defendant did not commit."103 Finally, if the
96. See text accompanying note 16, supra.
97. For example, West Virginia's Supreme Court issued a landmark decision recognizing
prosecutors' constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence during plea bargain-
ing-a stage when prosecutorial power is relatively unchecked. Buffeyv. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d
204, 221 (W. Va. 2015) (overturning conviction predicated on guilty plea where prosecutors
suppressed favorable DNA test results). A constitutional decision such as this one is prefer-
able to a comparable interpretation of Rule 3.8(d) because a constitutional violation can re-
sult not only in professional discipline but in the reversal of a criminal conviction.
98. See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Changes to Model Rules Impact Prosecutors,
CRIM. JUST., Spring 2008, at 1.
99. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
873 (2012); see also Wayne D. Garris, Jr., Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8: The ABA
Takes a Stand against Wrongful Convictions, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 829 (2009).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(g)(1) (AM. BAR ASSN 2020).
101. Id. r. 3.8(g)(2).
102. Id. r. 3.8(g)(2)(i).
103. Id. r. 3.8(g)(2)(ii).
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investigation establishes clear and convincing evidence that the de-
fendant was convicted of a crime of which the defendant is innocent,
Rule 3.8(h) requires the prosecutor to attempt to rectify the wrong-
ful conviction.
10 4
As of this writing, nineteen state courts have incorporated a ver-
sion of either Rule 3.8(g) or Rule 3.8(h), or both, into their profes-
sional conduct rules.10 5 In late 2018, Michigan became the most
recent adopter.106 Michigan's rule was promoted by the Michigan
Innocence Clinic 107 and supported by a letter from the national In-
nocence Project 108 as well as one from former Michigan prosecu-
tors.109 But in Michigan, as in some (but not all) other states, state
and federal prosecutors opposed the provisions.11 0 Presumably, as
more state courts have adopted the rule, and time has passed with-
out incident, prosecutors' opposition to the rule becomes increas-
ingly less persuasive. Should reformers in the remaining states un-
dertake comparable efforts, which may consume resources and ul-
timately may fail, or should they focus their efforts exclusively in
other directions that they may consider to be more promising? In
this instance, the payoff of a successful effort is less clear: as Section
A acknowledges, there are multiple reasons to doubt the value of
Rules 3.8(g) and (h). We argue in section B, however, that these
provisions, and efforts to adopt them, have virtues that reformers
may be overlooking.
104. Id. r. 3.8(h).
105. Those states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Letter from Bruce A.
Green, Louis Stein Chair of Law, Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, to the Justices of the Mich.
Supreme Court (Sept. 11, 2018) (on file with author) (addressing the proposed amendment
of Rule 3.8 of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct).
106. See MICH. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f), (g).
107. See Letter from Mich. Innocence Clinic, Mich. Law, to the Justices of the Mich. Su-
preme Court (Aug. 27, 2018) (on file with author) (addressing comments on proposed revi-
sions to MCR 6.502(G) and MRPC 3.8).
108. See Letter from Innocence Project, Cardozo Sch. of Law, to the Clerk of the Mich.
Supreme Court (Aug. 30, 2018) (on file with author) (addressing the proposed amendment of
MCR 6.502 and MRPC 3.8).
109. See Letter from James S. Brady, Peter D. Houk & John Smietanka, Former Mich.
Prosecutors, to the Justices of the Supreme Court of Mich. (on file with author) (addressing
the prosecutors' support of the proposed amendments to MRPC 3.8).
110. See Letter from Prosecuting Attorneys Ass'n of Mich., to the Justices of the Supreme
Court (Aug. 31, 2018) (on file with author) (addressing the amendment o MRPC 3.8); Letter
from the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, E. and W. Dists. of Mich., to the Justices of the Mich. Su-
preme Court (Aug. 30, 2018) (on file with author) (addressing proposed revisions to MRPC
3.8). See generally Green, supra note 99, at 889-93.
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A. Reasons for Skepticism
There are at least five reasons why reformers might hesitate to
put their weight behind the post-conviction provisions.
First, as far as one can tell, no prosecutor has yet been disciplined
for violating Rules 3.8(g) or (h). Indeed, the drafters and propo-
nents considered it a selling point that, unlike Rule 3.8(d), these
provisions were not intended, or expected, to become the basis of
discipline.1 In large part, the assumption was that prosecutors
would simply comply with the rules, which seems like the ideal out-
come. But the fact that prosecutors are not expected to be punished
for violating these provisions might seem to be a deficiency from the
perspective of those who doubt that prosecutors will universally ad-
here to the rules and who believe that punishing prosecutors is im-
portant to promote prosecutors' compliance with the law. For ex-
ample, reformers regard the contempt conviction of former Texas
prosecutor Ken Anderson, who withheld exculpatory evidence in an
arson case, as a victory for their cause.11 2 If the prosecutorial ethics
rules governing prosecutors' post-conviction obligations are not
meant to be employed against prosecutors in disciplinary proceed-
ings, and they do not establish rights in the adjudicative process,
then one might wonder what they are for.
Second, so far, courts have only infrequently referred to these
provisions in their published decisions regarding defendants' post-
conviction rights and remedies.11 3 Published decisions suggest hat
courts are unreceptive to arguments that they should enforce the
rules as a new source of defendants' discovery rights.11 4 And there
111. Green, supra note 7, at 473 ("The drafters also emphasized that the provisions were
not meant to target 'well-intentioned prosecutors who make considered judgments' about
whether to reopen investigations or support motions to overturn convictions.") (quoting
Saltzburg, supra note 98, at 14).
112. Former Williamson County Prosecutor Ken Anderson Enters Plea to Contempt for
Misconduct in Michael Morton's Wrongful Murder Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Nov. 8,
2013), https://www.innocenceproj ect.org/former-williamson-county-prosecutor-ken-ander-
son-enters-plea to-contempt-for-misconduct-in- michael-mortonaes-wrongful-murderconvic-
tion/ ("Today's historic precedent demonstrates that when a judge orders a prosecutor to look
in his file and disclose exculpatory evidence, deliberate failure to do so is punishable by con-
tempt." (quoting Professor Barry C. Scheck, Professor of Law at Cardozo School of Law)).
113. See, e.g., Warney v. Monroe Cty., 587 F.3d 113, 125, 125 n.15 (2d Cir. 2009) ("The
advocacy function of a prosecutor includes seeking exoneration and confessing error to correct
an erroneous conviction. Thus, prosecutors are under a continuing ethical obligation to dis-
close exculpatory information discovered post-conviction." (citing and quoting MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(g), (h) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020)).
114. See Simpson v. United States, No. 1: 16-cv-01354-JES, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74091,
at *7 (C.D. Ill. May 16, 2017) ("[A]lthough Simpson argues that the U.S. Attorney for the
Central District of Illinois owed him a duty to investigate and follow the rules of professional
conduct and ethical standards, the Court does not need to determine whether the duties of
the U.S. Attorney are discretionary or ministerial, because here there is 'an adequate remedy
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is no evidence that criminal defense lawyers see the rules as a sig-
nificant potential source of rights, or even as rhetorically valuable.
Third, the rules fall far short of what reformers want prosecutors
to do in the post-conviction setting. Reformers urge prosecutors to
establish conviction integrity units that investigate wrongful con-
victions but have a broader role, instigate investigations when
doubts are raised about a convicted person's guilt based on a stand-
ard that is less exacting than that of Rule 3.8(g), and incorporate
procedural reforms that are not incorporated into the rules.11 5 Re-
formers would not be satisfied with the minimal response captured
by Rules 3.8(g) and (h).
Fourth, there may be little need to influence prosecutors to make
post-conviction disclosures, conduct post-conviction investigations,
and remedy wrongful convictions. Prosecutors' internal commit-
ment to correcting wrongful convictions may suffice in many or
most cases, making a rule unnecessary. Prosecutors who are not
sufficiently self-motivated may be motivated by professional and so-
cietal expectations that are not necessarily codified by political con-
siderations or by concerns about their reputations.
Fifth, even assuming prosecutors need a boost, it may be more
effective and/or more easily achievable to accomplish legislative re-
form that enhances prosecutors' post-conviction obligations and
their enforcement.
B. The Utility of Ethics Rules to Reform Efforts
In the face of reasons for criminal justice reformers generally to
be indifferent to prosecutorial ethics reform, and reasons for them
to be indifferent to Rules 3.8(g) and (h) in particular, why should
other than mandamus.") (citation omitted); Eden v. Ryan, No. CV-15-08020-PCT-DGC, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32415, at *20 (D. Ariz. Mar. 14, 2016) (" [T]he question of whether the pros-
ecutor complied with ER 3.8(g) and (h) of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct is not an
appropriate issue for habeas review") (citations omitted); State v. Harris, 893 N.W.2d 440,
456-57 (Neb. 2017) ("After a case is closed, there may be ethical duties that require prosecu-
tors to take action upon learning of evidence that creates a reasonable likelihood the defend-
ant did not commit the crime. But Nebraska's post-conviction statutes provide relief only for
constitutional violations that render a conviction void or voidable.") (citations omitted); see
also State v. Harris, 893 N.W.2d 317, 340 n.56 (Neb. 2017) ("After a case is closed, there may
be ethical duties that require prosecutors to take action upon learning of evidence that cre-
ates a reasonable likelihood the defendant did not commit the crime. But Nebraska's post-
conviction statutes provide relief only for constitutional violations that render a conviction
void or voidable.").
115. See, e.g., Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We
Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215




these provisions interest reformers? We would suggest a half dozen
reasons.
First, expressions of professional norms matter to individual law-
yers, including prosecutors. Certainly, courts and bar associations
assume these expressions matter, regardless of whether the norms
are enforceable, which is why they develop and promote civility
codes, professionalism codes, and other writings memorializing pro-
fessional norms that are not necessarily backed by enforceable
law.116 In the criminal justice context, the ABA has expended sub-
stantial resources over the course of a half century developing vol-
umes of ABA Criminal Justice Standards that codify aspirational
standards for the work of prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and
others in the criminal justice process.1 1 7 One of the objectives of law
is expressive.118 Even if a professional conduct rule is never en-
forced, it is law-not just an aspirational standard-that has ex-
pressive force in establishing judicial and professional expectations.
For prosecutors who aspire to do "the right thing" 119-presumably,
the vast majority of prosecutors-a normative statement in the law
should have some influence. Like most other lawyers, most prose-
cutors want to be considered law-abiding. Regardless of whether
discipline is a realistic possibility, they will comply with profes-
sional ethics rules because they are law and because they express a
professional consensus regarding how lawyers should behave.
Second, prosecutorial conduct rules may influence the culture of
prosecutors' offices and the broader judicial and professional cul-
tures within which prosecutors function. Different prosecutors and
prosecutors' offices take different approaches to many of the prob-
lems they encounter.1 20 Among these are post-conviction claims of
116. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Developing Standards of Conduct for Prosecutors and Crim-
inal Defense Lawyers, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1093, 1095-1100 (2011) (discussing the importance
of ABA standards on the prosecution and defense functions); Melissa S. Hung, Comment, A
Non-Trivial Pursuit: The California Attorney Guidelines of Civility and Professionalism, 48
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1127, 1142 (2008) ("Although the Guidelines do not directly confront
the roots of incivility, they still have the potential to positively affect the profession despite
their optional character.").
117. See generally Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards:
Forty Years of Excellence, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 10 (discussing significance of the
ABA's Criminal Justice Standards).
118. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2021 (1996). But see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2000).
119. See DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N OF THE STATE OF N.Y., "THE RIGHT THING": ETHICAL
GUIDELINES FOR PROSECUTORS (2016), http://www.daasny.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
2016-Ethics-Handbook.pdf
120. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Career Motivations of State Prosecutors,
86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1668, 1672-73 (2018) ("[T]he wide range of motivations among work-
ing prosecutors complicates the reform plans of newly elected prosecutors.").
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innocence: some prosecutors are more open than others to the im-
portance of reviewing new evidence of innocence and conceding
when an innocent person was convicted.121 We have previously ar-
gued that the greatest influence on prosecutors' professional con-
duct-for example, whether they take a liberal or conservative ap-
proach to disclosing exculpatory evidence-is the culture of their
offices. 122 Model Rules 3.8(g) and (h) may already influence the pro-
fessional culture because they are included in the set of rules on
which most law students are tested in law school classes on profes-
sional responsibility and on the national bar examination on pro-
fessional responsibility. Comparably, once Model Rules 3.8 (g) and
(h) are incorporated into state professional conduct codes, the rules
are likely to have a more significant impact because they may be
included in Continuing Legal Education programs for prosecutors
in the state and in writings prepared for the state's prosecutors re-
garding their professional practices.
What is important about the provisions, from a cultural perspec-
tive, is that they give expression to the paramount importance of
avoiding and correcting wrongful convictions. Much has been writ-
ten about prosecutors' overly aggressive attitudes toward their
work-for example, their desire just to secure convictions.1 23 To the
extent that prosecutors' offices can encourage a stronger commit-
ment to a different ethos-one that puts avoiding wrongful convic-
tions above securing convictions-prosecutorial practices will gen-
erally improve.
Third, Rules 3.8(g) and (h) impose minimal disciplinary stand-
ards that can be useful, particularly if they are understood to be
intended as a legal and professional floor, because they provide the
base on which advocates can seek to build. Lawyers do not ordinar-
ily want to be minimally competent or minimally ethical-to be do-
ing the bare minimum that they can get away with and still hold
onto their licenses. Certainly, prosecutors do not want to regard
121. See, e.g., Lara Bazelon, Ending Innocence Denying, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393, 458
(2018) ('A small but select group of prosecutors are innocence deniers, irrationally refusing
to admit that a wrongful conviction has occurred in the face of overwhelming evidence that
it has occurred.").
122. Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce Green, Prosecutors' Ethics in Context, in LAWYERS IN
PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 269 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds.,
2012); see also Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarcera-
tion, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 301, 326-27, 327 n.172 (2017) ("In a variety of contexts, it has
been argued that the best way to achieve change in the criminal justice process is to change
internal office culture, rather than imposing external legal requirements.") (citing authority).
123. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 355, 388 (2001) ("In view of the institutional culture of prosecutor's offices and
the culture of the adversary system generally, it is perhaps inevitable that the overriding
interest of prosecutors would be winning.").
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themselves, or be regarded by others in the profession, as aiming
low. In advocating for prosecutors to re-open individual criminal
cases based on new evidence, there may be a value to being able to
press the prosecutor to rise above the disciplinary minimum.
Likewise, in promoting the development of other law, it may be
useful to have Rules 3.8(g) and (h) in place as a foundation. The
underlying premises of these rules are that convictions of innocent
persons should not stand and that institutions of the state (in this
case, prosecutors' offices) have a responsibility to uproot and rem-
edy wrongful convictions. Rules 3.8(g) and (h) incorporate these
normative understandings into the law. One can now argue that
these principles, which are legally established, should be extended
to other contexts in which they are relevant: their significance is
not limited to the professional conduct of prosecutors.
For example, the principles codified in Rules 3.8(g) and (h) sup-
ported a claim that a convicted defendant should have access to the
state's evidence in order to subject it to newly available forensic
testing. Indeed, Justice Stevens referred to Rules 3.8(g) and (h) for
just this purpose in a dissenting opinion, joined by three other jus-
tices, in District Attorney's Office v. Osborne.124 His argument was
that the defendant's claimed right of access to DNA testing gains
strength not only from legislative developments but also from "re-
cent trends in legal ethics recognizing that prosecutors are obliged
to disclose all forms of exculpatory evidence that come into their
possession following conviction." 125 The rules may bolster argu-
ments for assertions of other post-conviction rights and remedies as
well. 126
Fourth, law that codifies professional expectations may influence
prosecutors who might otherwise not accept those expectations.
Prosecutors have sometimes opposed these rules on the ground that
they are unnecessary because prosecutors accept the underlying
normative premises of these provisions.1 27 But that may not uni-
124. 557 U.S. 52, 94-95 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. Brief of Legal Ethics Scholars as Amici Curiae at 29, State v. Johnson, No. 2294 1-
03706A-01 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 23, 2019), appeal docketed, Nos. ED108193, ED108223 (Mo. Ct.
App. Sept. 4, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id-3475542 (discuss-
ing prosecutors' ethical, professional, and legal obligations as a minister ofjustice in taking
steps to remedy a wrongful conviction).
127. See, e.g., Memorandum from the U.S. Attorney of the W. Dist. of Tenn. to the Clerk
of Tenn. Appellate Courts on Objections to Adoption of Proposed Tennessee Rules 3.8(g) and
(h) (Dec. 14, 2009) (on file with author) ("The Department would not countenance the contin-
ued incarceration of someone who was convicted and later found to be innocent of the crime
of which he or she was convicted. When confronted with credible evidence of a defendant's
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formly be true. The recent history of efforts to expand pretrial dis-
covery obligations and post-conviction efforts to exonerate convicted
defendants based on new evidence and information has sometimes
shown seemingly unfathomable resistance by prosecutors.128 As
has been amply demonstrated, prosecutors certainly resist addi-
tional pretrial disclosure obligations.129 In the post-conviction set-
ting, those who embrace the idea of reopening cases and rectifying
wrongful convictions may believe that all other prosecutors do too,
but criminal justice reformers believe otherwise. Some of those who
might otherwise resist the idea may be influenced by disciplinary
rules spelling out their post-conviction obligations, however unde-
manding the rules may be.
Fifth, it may be valuable in the context of a judicial rule-making
process to provoke a public discussion and debate about prosecu-
tors' obligations. To the extent that prosecutors oppose the rules
based on a debatable conception of their role and responsibilities,
their views can be challenged. If the judiciary adopts Rules 3.8(g)
and (h) over prosecutors' objection, that may be viewed as an affir-
mation of prosecutors' duties and a rejection of prosecutors' con-
trary assertions.
With respect to Rules 3.8(g) and (h), in Michigan, the United
States Attorneys' written objections to the proposed rules reflected
debatable understandings of law and practice that federal prosecu-
tors probably do not ordinarily express publicly. For example, fed-
eral prosecutors asserted that when they know of new, credible and
material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that an innocent
person was wrongly convicted, federal law often precludes them
from disclosing the evidence promptly, if at all,130 and likewise pre-
cludes them from investigating to determine whether the person is
in fact innocent.1 31 They also asserted that federal prosecutors were
innocence, therefore, the Department expects its attorneys to disclose this information to the
defendant or the court whenever the information is obtained-pre-trial, during trial, or after
conviction.").
128. See generally Bazelon, supra note 121.
129. See supra notes 60-69.
130. See Letter from the U.S. Attorneys' Offices to the Justices of the Mich. Supreme
Court, supra note 110, at 2 ('Some disclosures are outright prohibited, some must wait for
an investigation to run its course, some are permissible only with judicial or agency author-
ization.").
131. See id. at 2-3:
Proposed Rule 3.8(f)(2)'s investigative requirements raise similar incompatibilities
with federal law. Although existing investigative tools and resources will sometimes
permit prosecutors to conduct or bring about the investigation contemplated by pro-
posed Rule 3.8(f) (2), many times they will not. Federal law enforcement agencies have
no statutory authority to conduct those types of investigations, and many investigative
tools and resources are only permitted for specific violations offederal law. It may well
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not free to take remedial measures when they ascertained conclu-
sively that they had convicted an innocent person.132 The Depart-
ment of Justice and individual federal prosecutors may rethink the
views expressed by Michigan's two United States Attorneys now
that the Michigan Supreme Court has found them to be unconvinc-
ing.
Sixth, although serving as a potential basis for professional dis-
cipline may be one of the less important contributions of Rules 3.8
(g) and (h), the disciplinary consequences hould not be overlooked.
There may be prosecutors, however aberrational, who will ignore or
bury significant new exculpatory evidence in order to avoid jeopard-
izing a conviction. Although such prosecutors may be subject to
sanction under open-ended professional conduct rules, such as the
prohibition on "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice,"' 133 courts may be reluctant to impose discipline without the
more explicit mandate afforded by Rules 3.8(g) and (h).13
4
IV. CONCLUSION
Many legal academics think that professional regulation should
play a bigger role in criminal justice reform, but reform groups ap-
pear to be unpersuaded that prosecutors' practices can be meaning-
fully improved through new professional conduct rules, broader in-
terpretations of existing rules, and enhanced disciplinary and judi-
cial enforcement of these rules. Efforts to reform prosecutorial
practices have focused instead on legislation and judicial decision
making. Reform groups' skepticism of professional regulation is un-
derstandable for reasons we have identified. But, on balance, we
think professional regulation should not be overlooked as one
among various approaches.
As we have shown, prosecutors' pretrial disclosure obligations
can be expanded via professional regulation: in some jurisdictions,
courts can be persuaded to adopt and enforce an interpretation of
Rule 3.8(d), the prosecutorial disclosure rule, that is more demand-
ing than constitutional case law. Likewise, courts can be persuaded
to codify prosecutors' post-conviction obligations, which are now
be that Congress will appropriate funds and legislatively enable agencies to investigate
otherwise closed cases. But it has not yet done so.
132. Id. at 4.
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
134. See Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline v. Hanna, 513 S.W.3d 175, 184 (Tex. App. 2016)
(finding that although prosecutors owed a post-conviction duty to disclose evidence of inno-
cence, they could not be sanctioned in the disciplinary process for violating that duty, because
Texas had not adopted Rules 3.8(g) & (h)).
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largely discretionary in most jurisdictions, by adopting a version of
Rules 3.8(g) and (h). These two examples, on which we have fo-
cused, are certainly not the only ones. Courts might be persuaded
to adopt a more robust approach to prosecutorial regulation in other
respects as well. Of course, prosecutorial regulation is no panacea
for the limitations and deficiencies of the criminal justice process;
it is not even a panacea for the perceived problems of prosecutorial
conduct. But, as we have shown, there are benefits to be gained
from pursuing more robust prosecutorial regulation that can justify
taking reform efforts into this additional direction.
